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Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings,
A Functional Prospectus I
MAURICE

H. MERRILL*

Whenever existing legal institutions fail to take care adequately of
socially important interests, it is inevitable that new instrumentalities
and fresh procedures will be demanded and will arise. The luxuriant
fluorescence of administrative tribunals during the last half century, here
and in the British Empire alike, roots in a rich soil, the product of mouldering claims which perished because they could find neither shelter nor
sustenance, within the fields belonging to "our lady the Common
2
Law.

-"

There is no novelty in drawing a comparison between this phenomenon of our age and the rise of new tribunals in Tudor and Stuart
England. The likeness, in cause and in effect, has been remarked by
acutely incisive observers. 3 As in that era, so today we have with us the
problem of the relation between the old tribunals and the new in the
legal order. In that earlier time, after much turmoil and struggle 4
the Court of Chancery and its justice achieved acceptance as integral
parts of the legal order. Today it is commonplace to find the two bodies
of principle administered by the same tribunal. Other agencies, less fortunate, partly because they served too zealously the losing party in the
political strife between the adherents of Parliament and the Royalists,'
partly because of arbitrary and oppressive exercise of their power, 6 were
extirpated, and the places thereof knew them no more. Yet the verdict
of history attests that they rendered efficient and useful service. 7 Reform
might have involved less social waste than abolition.
The acrimony of the contest between the common law courts and
the other tribunals was heightened by the misfortune of jealousy, perReprinted by permission, from the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, March, 1944.
*Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma, formerly Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, and Editor of the NEBRASKA LAW BULLETIN.
'See Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1914)
Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 617 (1927) ; Metzler,The Growth and Development of Administrative Law, 19 MARQ. L. REV. 209
(1935).
'The personification is Sir Frederick Pollock's in The Genius of the Common Law,
1,12 COL. L.REV. 189, 190 (1912).
'See Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1914) ; Willis.
Three Approaches to Administrative Law, 1 U. Tor. L. J. 53 (1935).
4See 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 459-465 (3d ed. 1922).
'See 1 HOLDSWORTH. op. cit. supra note 4,479.
"See 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 4, 500, 514.
'See I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 4, 507.
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sonal8 and professional. 9 Surely it is a good omen that the bar today is
so studiously pondering the problem of fitting the administrative agencies into the general system of dispensing justice rather than engaging in
sanguinary and ill-advised battles against them. There is reason to hope
that in our time we may effect a proper reception into the legal order of
these useful tribunals and the interests they serve, rather than hinder or
defeat the one by destroying the other. 10 In the light of this hope, we
may approach that aspect of the problem of the adjustment between
administration and the legal order involved in the extent to which decisions of administrative bodies should be reviewable by the courts.
Since our problem is stated in terms of oughtness, we are free to
look to considerations of policy and expediency. Constitutional law,
itself, may be re-examined, for, since Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins," we recognize that even centenarian error remains subject to correction, and, if it proves impossible to convince the judges that they have
misread the Constitution, there endures the amending process with
which to bring in any changes that we may find desirable. Indued with
this freedom of investigation, let us consider the relationship of commissions and courts in the light of the purposes which the former are to
serve and of the ends we seek to accomplish by imposing judicial review
upon them.
The advantages which have been claimed for the administrative
tribunals are: (1) legislative relief from detailed specification;1 2 (2)
facility of adjustment in rule-making;' 5 (3) expert judgment, deriving
from specialization 14 and from accumulated experience; 15 (4) celerity
and dispatch in action,6 contrasted with the cumbersome traditional
procedure of the courts;' 7 (5) freedom from the technicalities of the
common law rules of evidence;'" (6) the administrator's power of initiating action" and acquiring information by independent investigation,'
'See Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law, V, 12 COL. L. REV. 577, 582
(1912).
'See I HOLDSWORTH. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 414, 459, 486, 508 (3d ed.
1922).
"Cf. O'Reilly, Administrative Absolutism. 7 FORD. L. REV. 310 (1938).
11304 U. S. 64, 82 L. ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
"United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 55 L. ed. 563, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1911).
"See ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 274 (1928): Rosenberry,
The Supremacy of the Law; Law vs. Discretion, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (1938).

"See ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 267 (1928); LANDIS.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 23 (1938).
"5See ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. 273 (1928); cf. Pitney.
J., in Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U. S. 564, 61 L. ed. 1321, 37 S. Ct. 701, P. U. R.
1917F, 64 (1917).
"See ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 264 (1928): Rosenberry,
The Supremacy of the Law: Law vs. Discretion. 23 MARQ. L, REV. 1, 6 (1938).
"See Pound, Justice Accordinq to Law, 14 COL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1914).
"See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 94b (3d ed. 1940).
"See LANDIS. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 34 (1938). Cf. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury. 14 F. Supp. 156 (N. D. Calif. 1936).
"See LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 37 (1938).
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compared with the judge's dependence upon litigants and their counsel;
(7) cheapness to the parties; 2' (8) expedition in ascertaining the rules
applicable to one's conduct; 22 (9) opportunity for individualization in
the application of social rules; "2 and (10) placing the enforcement of a
desired policy in the hands of officials believed to be more sympathetic
therewith and better fitted for its administration than judges. 24 The
ends to be achieved by judicial review of administrative action may be
summarized as: (1) enforcement of constitutional limitations; 2 5 (2)
restriction of the administrative to the bounds of its appointed jurisdiction; 26 (3) the maintenance of procedural decencies; 27 (4) the prevention of prejudiced or arbitrary action: 28 (5) the avoidance of judgment
"influenced by extraneous considerations"; 2 (6) the incitation of the
administrative to higher standards of adjudication; and (7), perhaps,
the correction of erroneous administrative judgment.3s These are the
aims which have presented themselves to various thinkers as worthy
objectives. How may we so mould our judicial review of administrative
action as to achieve the fullest possible realization of these ends? To
what extent must we limit or forego some of them, in order to safeguard
others which seem more important? I propose to discuss these questions, first, with relation to judicial oversight of administrative procedure; second, in respect to the review of the substance of administrative
action; and, finally, with regard to certain problems of technique in the
exercise of judicial review.
"See

ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 263 (1928).
"'One of the chief reasons for setting up administrative agencies in so many connections is to further expedition in the determination of individual rights instead of
leaving the individual to guess as to what he may do safely and judge his action after the
event." Report of Special Committee on Administrative Law, Advance Program, 61st
Annual Meeting, American Bar Assn., 134, 138 (1938).
'See Pound, Individualization of Justice, 7 FORD. L. REV. 153, 163 (1938)
Lavery, The "Findability" of the Law, 27 J. AM. JUD. SOC., 25 (1943).
"See ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. 275 (1928); LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 32 (1938); Rosenberry, The Supremacy of the
Law: Law vs. Discretion, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 7 (1938) ; Vanderbilt, The Place of
the Administrative Tribunal in Our Legal System. 24 A. B. A. J. 267, 269, 12 U. CIN.
L. REV. 118, 128 (1938).
'St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 80 L. ed. 1033, 56
S. Ct. 720 (1936).
2'See
ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 236 (1927).
' O h:o Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 81 L. ed.
1093. 57 S. Ct. 724 (1937).
'See Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 618
(1927): ROBSON. JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 236 (1928).

2See ROBSON,
'See

JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 236 (1928).
HEWART, THE NEW DESPOTISM. 156 (1929): ALLEN, BUREAUCRACY

TRIUMPHANT. 7 (1931).
" 'I cannot see why the findings of fact of a trained equity or admiralty judge
should be subject to complete review, and the findings of fact of the Commissioner, who
is often without legal training, in cases far more complicated than ordinary equity or
admiralty suits, are subject to a far less rigid review." Vanderbilt, The Bar and the
Public. 62 A.B.A. REP.. 464, 470 (1937).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW AS TO PROCEDURE

First, as to procedure, there will be, I take it, little dissent from the
proposition that this presents one of the most appropriate fields for wise
and effective judicial guidance of administrative behavior. Not only do
our constitutional guaranties of due process of law speak alike to the
learned and the unlearned with especial emphasis upon decent standards
of behavior in the conduct of governmental activity; it is to be remembered, also, that the courts have back of them centuries of experience in
the adjustment of disputes among men and in the problem of assuring
to the participants in these disputes a fair and adequate opportunity to
present their respective contentions. The administrative agencies, relatively new in the field, have no similar traditions and experience behind
them. They have burgeoned with such rapidity that they have had little
time to consider procedural niceties a priori, particularly since they are
sent out, each with an urgent legislative command to enforce sbme vital
policy. The development of methods of practice, equable as well as
efficient, and of an esprit de corps, jealously guarding a high repute for
just administration, must be the work of years,3 2 as the experience of
judicial agencies attests.3 3 Special circumstances surrounding many of
our administrative tribunals tend to retard this evolution.34 Hence, while
we realize fully that "The Constitution of the United States is not a
code of civil practice," 35 we may feel assured that application of "the
rudiments of fair play ' ' 36 in commission procedure may be fostered materially through the assistance afforded by a wisely administered judicial
supervision.
Examples of the appropriate exercise of this supervision abound in
many fields. It is of high importance that in the assessment of taxes
according to valuation,3 7 in public utility regulation,3 s in licensing pro"A sympathetic, as well as able, observer of the first of our great federal commissions speaks of improvements in practice "springing from administrative experience."
See 4 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 163 (1937).
'Note, for example, the poor state of judicial justice in medieval England, Riddell,
Erring Judges of the Thirteenth Century, 24 MICH. L. REV. 329 (1926) ; Vance,
Law in Action in Medieval England, 17 VA. L. REV. 1 (1930) ; the low standard of
ethics in the chancery which could lead the bribe-taking Bacon to assert that he was
better than his predecessors, Huycke, Francis Bacon, 9 CAN. B. REV. 625, 629 (1926) :
5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW. 244-245 (1924); the corruption and
subservience of the Restoration courts, 6 Ibid., 503-513 (1924).
'See Report of Special Committee on Administrative Law, 61 A. B. A. REP..
720, 736-739 (1938).
'Cardozo, J., dissenting in Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 79 L. ed.
446, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
'Per Holmes, J., in Chicago, M. V4St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232 U. S. 165, 58 L. ed.
554, 34 S. Ct. 301 (1914).
"Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 52 L. ed. 134, 28 S. Ct. 47
(1907).
'Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 10 S. Ct.
462. 702 (1890).
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ceedings, 3a in the exclusion40 or the deportation of aliens,"' and in the
myriads of other administrative determinations affecting private interest, 4 2 it should be the established rule that the person affected "shall
have the-right to support his allegations by argument, however brief;
and, if need be, by proof, however informal"; 1 that is, the right to a
hearing upon appropriate notice. By these requirements, the public's
interest in the maintenance of procedural decency and in the prevention
of capricious action is promoted, the likelihood of judgment based upon
irrelevant factors is reduced, and the administrative tribunal is put upon
its mettle to produce a proper decree. Expert judgment is informed and
aided by hearing. Wise individualization of rules is advanced by it. So
long as the character of the notice required 4 4 and the nature of the hearing" are adjusted to the type of the proceeding, there need be no undue
burden upon the celerity or the efficiency of the administrative process.
Those particular emergencies calling for immediate action may be provided for, as they have been, by dispensing with the necessity for hearing
in advance of action,4 6 if adequate process for a later presentation of the
individual interests affected is provided.17
There has been some tendency to make the distinction that delegated legislative action may be taken without hearing because the legislature itself thus could act. 48 But the press of many tasks upon the
legislators and the limited time at their disposal make impossible the
more thorough process which the administrative bodies are equipped to
afford. The true distinction which should be made in this respect is that
suggested by Professor Fuchs, namely, to differentiate the "function of
laying down general regulations" from that of "taking * * * action
'Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, 70 L. ed.
494, 46 S. Ct. 215 (1925) (refusal) ; Hanson v. Michigan State Bd. of Registration,
253 Mich. 601, 236 N. W. 225 (1931) (revocation).
"Chin Low v. U. S., 208 U. S. 8, 52 L. ed. 369, 28 S. Ct. 201 (1908).
"The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 47 L. ed. 721, 23 S. Ct. 611
(1903).
' 2Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 78 L. ed. 260, 54 S. Ct. 148 (1933)
(order to install grade crossing).
'Per Moody, J., in Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 52
L. ed, 1103, 28 S. Ct. 708 (1908).
"Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 60 L. ed.
(general notification by statute sufficient in board of
372, 36 S. Ct. 141 (1915)
equalization) ; San Diego Land &. Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L.
ed. 1154, 19 S. Ct. 804 (1899) (same as to rate-making).
" Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 77 L. ed. 796,
53 S, Ct. 350 (1933) (hearing before tariff commission may conform to legislative
practice). And see Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV.
259 (1938).
'North American Cold Stor. Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 53 L. ed. 195, 29
S.Ct. 101 (1908).
"Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133. 38 L. ed. 385, 14 S. Ct. 499 (1893)
Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891) ; Peo. v. Board of Health, 140
N.Y. 1. 35 N.E. 320 (1893).
"Com. v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619 (1905) ; Randall Gas Co. v.
Star Glass Co., 78 W. Va. 252, 88S. E. 840 (1916).

204

DICTA

applying to named or specified persons or situations."" In respect to
action of the first type, many factors combine to render insistence upon
an antecedent bearing as useless for the effective protection of vital interests.as it is impractical." The persons to be affected by the contemplated order are numerous; often they are widely dispersed. By
hypothesis, the regulations touch the public interest, and that interest
ought not to brook the delay which would be apt to arise from notification of the proposed order to so large a group and from affording full
hearing to all who might apply. 1 Adequate protection to the individual
can be extended when enforcement is sought against him.52 Hence it is
quite proper that the courts should concede, as they do,5 3 that the exercise of this rule-making power may proceed without advance notice and
opportunity to be heard. On the other hand, where the action, even
though it may eventuate in an order "legislative" in character according
to the well-known test approved by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Compan, 5 4 is projected against
one or a few specifically designated respondents, the modern tendency is
to insist that administrative bodies should extend to them the more civilized procedure, involving notice and hearing, which is made possible by
their form of organization and their resources of time and of personnel. 55
Such procedure is calculated to save time, money and effort for all concerned, and I think we shall do well to approve the current trend toward
insistence thereon. If there is any room for continued resort to the supposed rule that administrative action of specific application can be taken
without notice and hearing simply because a legislature could have done
the same thing in that way, it is only with relation to tribunals which in
fact possess broad legislative or rule-making power and in respect to
action which they might have taken in that capacity.56
Of course, the notice and hearing requirement must be administered
in a statesmanlike manner. While statutory commands as to the character of the notice must be enforced,? 7 in the absence of legislative provis.on there should be no attempt, as of constitutional right or by im"'See Fuchs, Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REv. 259, 265 (1938).
"Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 P. 595 (1920).
State v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 A. 116 (Err. F A. 1935).
2
-rain v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 523, 11 N. E. 929, 59 Am. Rep.
113 (1887). See also HART, INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 276
'(1940).
"Bartlett-F-razier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933): State v.
Newark Milk Co.. 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 A. 116 (Err. 8 A. 1935); H. F. Wilcox
Oil V Gas Co. v. State, 162 Okla. 89, 19 P. (2d) 347, 86 A. L. R. 421 (1933)
(dictum): Greer v. Railroad Comm.. 117 S. W. (2d) 142 (Tex. Civ. A., 1938):
Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger. 113 Wash. 359, 194 P. 595 (1920).
'"211 U.S. 210. 53 L. ed. 150. 29S. Ct. 67 (1908).
Southern Ry. v. Virginia. 290 U. S. 190, 78 L. ed. 260, 54 S. Ct. 148 (1933).
Some courts, unwisely, it is believed, even apply the requirement to rule-making.
McGrew v. Industrial Com., 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 608 (1938).
'Burgess v. Brockton. 235 Mass. 95, 126 N. E. 456 (1920).
"Alderman v. Town of \Vest Haven, 124 Conn. 391, 200 A. 330 (1938).
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plication out of statutory generalities, to require notification of a type
which would impose an undue burden upon the administrative process,
as, for example, a monition to each individual patron in rate proceedings."' In appropriate cases, such devices as notice to the proper representatives of a numerous class should be permitted." '
The requirement of a hearing upon notice brings us but to the
threshold of appropriate judicial supervision over the administrative
process. If the exaction of a hearing is to mean anything, oversight must
extend to the point of ascertaining that the hearing affords an effective
forum for the presentation of one's case rather than a sterile formality.
By notice or in some other manner, the parties should be informed of the
nature of the action to be taken" and the issues involved.G1 Otherwise,
"the fundamentals of a fair hearing" are denied. G2 But control in this
field must be exercised with the highest degree of wisdom, since it
touches closely upon the administrative advantages of informality,
celerity, and freedom from the technical formalities of legal procedure.
Hence, the courts must watch carefully lest their defense of the individual's right to apprisal of the issues lapse into captious and useless
imposition of their own ideas of good form upon the administrative
tribunal. If by the terms of the notice, however unconventional, G or by
evolution through a protracted hearing with full opportunity for the
presentation of rebuttal 64 and clarification of the issues by argument,or by any other method, the persons subjected to the administrative
jurisdiction actually are informed of the matters they are to meet and
are afforded a fair chance to make their representations effectively, there
should be no judicial insistence upon any special formality.
Another aspect of procedure in which judicial intervention frequently is invoked concerns personnel. The court's refusal, in the absence of statutory direction, to condem.n the delegation of hearing in the
Southern Oil Corp. v. Yale Nat. Gas Co., 89 Okla. 121, 214 P. 131 (1923).
'Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Com., 13 F. (2d) 673
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
'Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 412 (Ct. of Cust. Z Pat. App.
1935); Pioneer Tel. ZLTel. Co. v. State, 38 Okla. 412, 133 P. 476 (1913).
' 5West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (No. 1), 294 U. S. 63, 79
L. ed. 761, 55 S.Ct. 316 (1935).
West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (No. 1), supra note 61:
Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 83 L. ed. 1129, 58 S. Ct. 773 (1938).
'In re Van Hyning, 257 Mich. 146, 241 N. W. 207 (1932).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938), [cert. den. 304 U. S. 576, 82 L. ed. 1540. 58 S. Ct. 1046
(1938), 304 U. S. 585, 82 L. ed. 1546, 58 S. Ct. 1061 (1938). reh. den. 304
U.S. 590, 82 L. ed. 1549, 58 S. Ct. 1054 (1938)].
'National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio F3Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333, 82
L.ed. 1381, 58 S.Ct. 904 (1938).
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6
first instance to single members of the tribunal" or to trial examiners,67
or to demand a continuity of membership between the time of hearing
and the time of decision, 6 seems eminently proper. Those considerations of celerity, economy, and facility of adjustment which we have
seen bulk so large in the argument for the administrative process are

greatly advanced by this way of proceeding. A determination made
upon a perusal of the written record in no way prevents the parties from
presenting fully their case nor does it make more difficult the task of
judicial review. Only the argument that better judgment results from
personal observation of the witnesses may be brought against it. When
we recall that the other great legal system of the world sets no such store
upon testimony viva voce," and that the equity practice for a long time
rejected it, 70 we may feel a proper reluctance to insist that our new tribunals be compelled to rely upon it.
The problem of prejudice appears to afford an opportunity for the
exercise of valuable judicial supervision extending farther than is commonly practiced. Hypertechnical charges of unfairness, such as the bias
alleged to rise from the desire to establish a reputation for efficiency"
or the faithful enforcement of policy,72 should not be made a basis for
judicial review, for obvious reasons. On the other hand, participation

by a commissioner given to favoritism, '3 or by one whose activities in
the preliminary transactions show forth prejudice in its original sense
of pre-judgment, 7 1 properly are recognized as vitiating the administrative decree. The generally received exception to this rule, where the
exclusion of the prejudiced member would destroy the tribunal,

75

is of

"'Davidson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 91 F. (2d) 516 (C. C. A. 5th,
1937). But cf. Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, 28 Calif. A. (2d) 224, 82
P. (2d)7 185 (1938).
1 National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio F4 Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333,
82 L. ed. 1381, 58 S. Ct. 904 (1938).
'United States v. Reiner, 83 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) : Visceglia v.
United States, 24 F. Supp. 355 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). Cf. Hewitt's Appeal, 76 Conn.
685, 58 A. 231 (1904).
5
'See Le Paulle, A Study in Coniparative Civil Law, 12 CORN. L. Q. 24, 32
(1926).
,'See 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW. 353 (1926); 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, 199 (3d ed. 1940); 1 WHITEHOUSE, EQUITY PRACTICE, 568 (1915).

'Duff
v. Osage County, 180 Okla. 387, 70 P. (2d) 79 (1937).
2
7 Georgia Continental Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 8 F. Supp. 434. 6
P. U. R. (N. S.) 359 (N. D. Ga. 1934) ; Montana Pow. Co. v. Public Service Commission. 12 F. Supp. 946, 12 P. U. R. (N. S.) 511 (D. Mont. 1935).
-United States v. Redfern, 180 F. 500 (C. C. La. 1910) ; Narragansett Racing
Assn. v. Kiernan, 59 R. I.90, 194 A. 692 (1937).
'United States v* Reynolds, 2 F. Supp. 290 (N. D. Ind. 1932).
7
Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; Georgia Continental Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 8 F. Supp. 434, 6 P. U. R. (N. S.) 359
(N. D. Ga. 1934). Hence board members may not be questioned to show their prejudice. In re Reno, 57 Nev. 314, 64 P. (2d) 1036 (1937). See also United States v.
Morgan, 313 U. S. 409. 85 L. ed. 1429. 61 S. Ct. 999 (1941).
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questionable expedience. In view of the high chance of arbitrary infringement of individual interests in such a case, it seems that there is no
undue hampering of administrative efficiency in holding that due process
is violated if the legislature makes no provision for disqualification and
76
substitution.
Once more, though, it is necessary to sound a note of caution. It is
essential to draw the line between personal prejudice and an opinion
as to proper policy held by the member of a tribunal, such as a board of
medical examiners, instructed by the legislature to implement and enforce a standard. In such a one, strong conviction, at least of a reasonable nature, concerning what 7the
social interest demands, ought not to
7
be adjudged a disqualification.
(Concluded in September Issue)

7
State v. Aldridge, 212 Ala. 660, 103 S. 835 (1925); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Ida.
532, 207 P. 724 (1922).
"Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936).
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